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Abstract: 
The modern field of cultural evolution is now over thirty years old, and an 
extensive body of theory and data has been amassed. This paper reviews models of 
cultural evolution, both experimental and theoretical, and surveys what they can tell 
us about cultural evolutionary processes. The models are grouped according to which 
of four broad questions they address: (i) How are cultural traits changed during 
transmission? (ii) How and why do cultural traits accumulate over time? (iii) What 
social learning biases do people use? and (iv) What are the population-level 
consequences of different social learning biases? We conclude by highlighting gaps in 
the literature and promising future research directions, including the further 
integration of theoretical models and experimental data, the identification of the 
factors underlying cumulative cultural evolution, and the explanation of individual 
and cultural variation in social learning biases. 
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1. Overview 
The main principle of the field of cultural evolution is that culture evolves in a 
Darwinian manner – that is, through a process of variation, competition and 
inheritance, just as Darwin outlined in The Origin of Species1,2. Culture, in this usage, 
is taken to mean any information that is transmitted from individual to individual via 
social learning, rather than information that is transmitted genetically, or information 
that is invented de novo by an individual independently and not transmitted.  
 
The argument for this idea is relatively straight-forward. Cultural traits, such as 
technological inventions, languages and linguistic features, religious and social 
customs, and so on, clearly vary (amongst each other), reproduce (from individual to 
individual), and compete (for memory or adoption). For example, there are around 
6800 languages in the world, and approximately 5 million distinct patents have been 
issued in the US since its founding2. Languages are clearly learnt socially, while 
patents explicitly build on and cite earlier patents. Finally, competition takes place 
between cultural traits within these systems, such as the replacement of many 
irregular verbs with regular verbs in English since medieval times3 and the 
replacement of certain stone tools with other types in the archaeological record4.  
 
Describing cultural change as ‘Darwinian’ implies no more than that culture exhibits 
these three properties (variation, competition and inheritance), and makes no further 
claims regarding the relative importance of each of these, or the underlying 
mechanisms governing them. Consequently, while both cultural and biological change 
can be described as ‘Darwinian’, their details may be very different5. For example, 
while inheritance does not typically play a major role in driving genetic change, 
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cultural inheritance/transmission may often be a major driver of macro-level cultural 
change in the absence of any competition/selection6,7. Similarly, while genetic 
variation arises through random mutation, new cultural variation may arise through 
non-random and intentional invention8. These differences do not invalidate a 
Darwinian model of cultural change, they merely require one that incorporates such 
differences. Finally, modeling cultural change as an evolutionary process does not 
require that culture must always act to increase biological fitness, and indeed it may in 
some cases produce biologically maladaptive or neutral behaviors9. 
 
The idea that culture evolves is in fact rather old; for example, Darwin mentions it in 
The Descent of Man10. Since then many prominent scholars in many fields have 
developed this idea, including William James11, Donald Campbell12, Richard 
Dawkins13, Karl Popper14, B.F. Skinner15, David Hull16, and Daniel Dennett17. The 
true beginning of the field, however, may be taken to be the books by Cavalli-Sforza 
& Feldman18 and Boyd & Richerson19, who were the first to take the idea and develop 
it in a quantitative way, while simultaneously incorporating aspects of cultural 
evolution that differ from biological evolution such as those noted above. Since then a 
good deal of detailed work has been done, which has recently been surveyed 
accessibly by Mesoudi5. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to review the more specialised literature of models, both 
experimental and theoretical, which has accumulated since the founding books by 
Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman18 and Boyd & Richerson19. The advantage of modeling is 
that it can shed light on complex phenomena by simplifying them, removing 
inessential features and focusing solely on those features that the modeller suspects 
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are important, or necessary to test a particular hypothesis. Mathematical models 
provide a way of running formal ‘thought-experiments’, by analyzing the 
consequences of a certain set of assumptions that are thought to hold in the real world, 
and provide a level of precision that is unattainable through purely verbal models. 
Laboratory experiments can also be used to model real-life instances of cultural 
evolution, allowing hypotheses to be tested under controlled conditions (again, 
removing all inessential features of reality) and allowing detailed records of behavior 
that are often not possible with real-life (e.g. archaeological or ethnographic) data. 
Compared to mathematical models, experiments add some degree of external validity 
in that they measure the decision-making processes of real people, who, due to 
imperfections or biases in that decision-making, may act in ways not captured or 
predicted by formal models. Thus modeling - both mathematical and experimental - is 
an important complement to observational research such as ethnographic field studies, 
historical and archaeological research, and statistical data mining. 
 
The review will be selective, rather than exhaustive, as the literature after thirty years 
is extensive. The review will focus exclusively on cultural evolution, rather than the 
interaction of cultural and biological evolution – itself an important and large topic 
with a varied literature known more specifically as gene-culture coevolution9,20. We 
also exclusively focus on humans, excluding the large and diverse literature on social 
learning in non-human animals21. 
 
The review is structured around four important questions in cultural evolution, that 
have recently received much research attention: 
1. How are cultural traits changed during transmission? 
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2. How and why do cultural traits accumulate over time? 
3. What social learning biases do individuals use? 
4. What are the population-level consequences of different social learning biases? 
 
2. How are cultural traits changed during transmission? 
In this section we discuss how cultural traits change during transmission generally, for 
example through remembering and perceiving. In the following section we discuss 
how cultural traits increase or decrease in utility during transmission, leading to the 
phenomenon of cumulative cultural evolution. 
 
It is well known that traits change simply through the process of learning, or copying, 
on the part of a naive individual. This process was first studied experimentally by 
Frederic Bartlett22, who pioneered the 'transmission chain' method. In this method, 
one individual is seeded with a cultural trait of some kind – for instance, a story or a 
picture – and then this individual transmits the trait to a second individual, who in turn 
transmits the trait to a third, and so on. The method can also be varied to have more 
than one individual in each link of the 'chain', so that a group of individuals in some 
way transmit a trait to another group of individuals. Finally, in this group setting, the 
'turnover' of the chain can be altered so that instead of the entire group changing at 
every step, only one individual of the group is replaced by a new individual; this is 
known as the 'replacement' method and was first proposed by Gerard, Kluckhohn & 
Rapoport23. The bulk of experiments pertaining to cultural evolution have been 
conducted with the transmission chain method and its variants24. 
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A large number of specific traits have been investigated with these methods, and 
different questions have been asked. The studies of Bartlett and his school25-28 tended 
to use stories and drawings, and to frame open-ended research questions: what 
patterns can be found in the variation of the traits as they are passed along the chain? 
They also asked how characteristics of the subject – for example, their cultural 
background or social status – affected the changes seen in the traits. Specific 
hypotheses, on the other hand, did not tend to be tested. The general conclusions were 
that, as they were transmitted, traits tended to lose detail and to increasingly resemble 
the individuals’ preconceived notions. For example, in one of Bartlett’s 
experiments22, an American Indian story called the ‘War of the Ghosts’ was passed 
through a transmission chain made up of British participants, with the result that 
details such as the names of the warriors were lost, and unfamiliar elements such as 
the American Indian notion that something black comes out of a dying warrior’s 
mouth was transformed into the more familiar Judao-Christian idea that his soul 
leaves his body.  
 
However, the focus of these studies was on human psychology – memory – and not 
on cultural traits and their evolution. More recent studies have revisited this method 
with a view to understanding the details of cultural evolution. Thus, for example, 
Mesoudi, Whiten & Dunbar29 found that social information in stories was transmitted 
more accurately and lost less frequently than non-social information, in line with 
‘social brain’ theories that posit that human cognition evolved primarily to deal with 
social information. Bangerter30 found that gender stereotypes were superimposed on 
descriptions of scientific phenomena, with initially neutral descriptions of conception 
gradually transformed such that sperm cells were attributed activity and ova attributed 
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passivity. Many similar experiments now give us a reasonable understanding of the 
variation in traits caused by the process of transmission24. These variations constitute 
examples of what is called ‘cultural mutation’ by some18 or ‘guided variation’ by 
others19 in the literature, where individuals change the traits that they receive from 
others in some non-random, biased manner, before the trait is passed on to another 
individual.  
 
Researchers have also attempted to model these processes of change through 
transmission mathematically. The leading methodology here is the 'Bayesian' 
approach31-33. In this approach individuals are thought of as possessing 'prior' biases 
(whether learned and/or innate) for certain characteristics of cultural traits (e.g. 
simplicity or learnability). They then observe 'data' from another individual composed 
of samples from a distribution of traits with varying characteristics. The models 
suppose that individuals combine these two sources of information in a manner that 
can be described by Bayes' theorem and create a 'posterior' distribution of trait 
characteristics which they present in turn to the next individual. This approach has 
had remarkable success in producing predictions qualitatively in accord with 
experimental results, even in experiments not originally designed to test the models 
(e.g. Beppu & Griffiths34, who created a Bayesian model which recreated the 
experimental results found by Jacobs & Campbell35 that are discussed below). 
 
While all of the afore-mentioned studies were carried out in a laboratory with a 
controlled experimental design, an important recent development has been the use of 
an 'open diffusion' method36,37, in which the individuals with whom the new trait is 
seeded are allowed to freely interact within a social group, and the transmission of the 
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trait is observed. This technique allows researchers to document features of cultural 
transmission such as who chooses to transmit what to whom; for example, McGuigan 
& Cubillo37 found that male children were more likely to transmit gossip than female 
children, and that both genders were more likely to transmit gossip than surprising 
factual information. The downside of this method is of course that some experimental 
control and precision is lost. 
 
3. How and why do cultural traits accumulate over time? 
Cumulative cultural evolution refers to the presence of traits that have been gradually 
modified and built upon over successive generations such that they are beyond the 
capabilities of a single individual to invent in a single lifetime38,39. Examples include 
the startling technological, scientific, artistic, and social achievements of humanity. 
Mathematical knowledge, for example, took thousands of years to accumulate40, with 
the Sumerians inventing written numerical notation around 2400 BC, Babylonians 
inventing simple arithmetical operations around 2000 BC, the Greeks contributing 
geometry in 300 BC, Arab scholars inventing algebra around 800 AD, and so on up to 
the present day. These accumulated traits can be distinguished from the cultural traits 
of other animals, such as nut-cracking in chimpanzees or the songs of certain species 
of birds, which do not appear to have accumulated over successive generations and 
could plausibly have been invented de novo by a single individual. The question here, 
then, is what factors allow and affect the accumulation of cultural traits in humans41. 
 
Experimental work on cumulative culture using the transmission chain method was 
initiated by Caldwell & Millen42. In their experiments, individuals perform 
technological tasks that have a clear goal and measure of success, such as constructing 
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a paper airplane to fly as far as possible, or building a tower using spaghetti and clay 
as high as possible. Each participant completes this task as best they can, after which 
successive individuals in the chain perform the same task but are able to observe the 
previous individual's solution. The focus in these experiments is less on the nature of 
the cognitive processes involved in the task, and more on the degree to which 
successive individuals are able to improve on their predecessor's solution, and in the 
conditions which exacerbate or attenuate this improvement. 
 
Caldwell & Millen42 found that the quality of solutions improved as the tasks were 
transmitted through a chain, indicative of cumulative cultural change. In further 
studies43 the same authors addressed whether particular mechanisms of social learning 
- imitation, emulation, or teaching - are necessary for accumulation. Imitation 
involves copying behaviours (here, the motor actions required to make the paper 
airplane), emulation involves copying end-products (here, the finished airplane 
design), while teaching involves the transmission of explicit advice (here, advice 
about how to make the paper airplane). Caldwell & Millen43 found that each of these 
three mechanisms was sufficient, in contrast to previous claims that only imitation 
and teaching (and not emulation) can give rise to cumulative culture44. In a further 
study using the same task, meanwhile, it was found that allowing individuals to 
observe more than one model simultaneously did not increase the rate or degree of 
accumulation45. 
 
This last result is intriguing because several mathematical models of cultural 
accumulation have focused on the relationship between population size and the rate 
and degree of cultural accumulation. That population size is an important factor in 
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technological evolution in particular is suggested by both apparent links between 
increases in population sizes in the Upper Paleolithic and the concurrent appearance 
of so-called 'modern human behaviour', including complex stone tools, decorations, 
cave art, and musical instruments46,47, and by the drastic loss of technologies in 
Tasmania after the area became an island circa 10,000 years ago and was therefore cut 
off from Australia48. These observations led to the construction of models in which 
changes in population size led to changes in the rate and/or degree of cultural 
accumulation in the population46-48. This effect occurs because in larger populations 
complex skills are less likely to be lost due to random transmission error, and rare 
beneficial modifications are more likely to be made. More recent models have 
increased the complexity of these models. Mesoudi40 showed that an increasing cost 
of learning more, and more complicated, traits would produce S-shaped curves in the 
degree of complexity of over time, rather than a less realistic exponential increase in 
complexity to infinity. Pradhan et al.49 considered the effect of varying levels of 
interaction between members of the population, aiming specifically to explain the 
greater quantity of technologies found in chimpanzee populations compared to 
orangutan populations, and showed that this could be caused by the greater sociability 
of chimpanzees. 
 
While chimpanzee populations may have more cultural traits than orangutans, neither 
species, nor any other primate species, appears to exhibit cumulative culture. The 
social and cognitive factors that may be responsible for this difference have also been 
explored experimentally. Dean et al.50 had groups of capuchins, chimpanzees and 
children solve a three-stage puzzle box to obtain rewards, with each solution 
predicated on the previous one(s). The children significantly outperformed the 
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monkeys and chimpanzees on this minimally cumulative task, with verbal 
communication, imitation, and prosociality predicting the greater success in children. 
It is likely, therefore, that both socio-cognitive (e.g. imitation fidelity) and social 
demographic (e.g. population size/density) factors underlie the species differences in 
cumulative culture. 
 
More recently three experimental studies have revisited the hypothesis that cultural 
accumulation is facilitated by larger population sizes. Derex et al.51 found that simple 
(arrowheads) and complex (fishing nets) computer-designed traits were maintained 
only in larger groups of 8 or 16 participants, and not in smaller groups of 2 or 4 
participants. Muthukrishna et al.52 found that complex symbol designs and difficult-
to-tie knots were only maintained in transmission chains comprising five participants 
per generation, and not chains composed of a single participant in each chain. 
Similarly, Kempe & Mesoudi53 found that jigsaw puzzles increased in completeness 
in three-per-generation transmission chains and not in one-per-generation chains. The 
negative finding of Caldwell & Millen45, therefore, may have been due to the 
particular task that they used, which may not benefit from social learning as much as 
the tasks employed in these subsequent studies. 
 
4. What social learning biases do individuals use? 
'Social learning biases’ here refers to the innate or learned rules which people use 
when copying other individuals54: rules specifying, for instance, what or from whom 
to learn. The use of the term ‘bias’ here is intended in a statistical sense, as indicating 
a deviation from ‘unbiased’, or undirected/random social transmission (rather than the 
normative sense of, say, ‘racial bias’). While there has been a good deal of theoretical 
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work investigating what social learning biases natural selection may favour19,55, in the 
end there is clearly only one way to definitively establish what social learning biases 
people use: empirical observation and experiment. Accordingly this section will focus 
on experimental work while the following section, dealing with the population-level 
consequences of given social learning biases, will focus on mathematical models, 
which allow such questions to be answered with suitable generality. 
 
Here we will focus more on biases that concern from whom and what to copy, and 
less on biases concerning when to copy (e.g. depending on life-history variables56). 
This focus is appropriate because 'who' and 'what' questions are more directly relevant 
to understanding the population-level consequences of social learning biases, which is 
one of the primary aims of cultural evolutionary theory. Similarly, cultural 
evolutionary research is generally less concerned with the specific mechanism by 
which social learning takes place, such as imitation, emulation, teaching, and so on – 
as long as there is some mechanism to provide relatively faithful transmission, who 
and what is copied is more important at the population level than how it is copied. For 
this reason the majority of research in social psychology57 and comparative 
psychology58 is only tangentially relevant to cultural evolution. 
 
Social learning biases relevant to cultural evolution can be divided into three 
categories using a convenient classification system due to Richerson & Boyd59: 
'content', 'model', and 'frequency-dependent' biases. Content biases occur when 
individuals pick a particular trait over others because of innate or learned preferences 
for a characteristic of that trait, such as its meaning, usefulness, or aesthetics. Model 
biases occur when individuals adopt traits because of a characteristic of the person 
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who knows the trait: for example, adopting a trait from prestigious or successful 
individuals60. Finally, frequency-dependent biases occur when individuals take up a 
trait because of the trait’s relative popularity, or unpopularity, compared to other traits 
in their population; examples of this include conformity, which in cultural evolution is 
defined as adopting the most popular trait in a population with a probability greater 
than its proportion of occurrence in the population61, or anti-conformity, where the 
least popular trait is adopted with a probability greater than its proportion of 
occurrence. 
 
While the transmission chain studies discussed in the previous section have been 
described as examples of content biases, content bias can also be seen to differ from 
cultural 'mutation' or the memorability of a cultural trait by the fact that individuals 
choose the relevant trait in some fashion. Using this definition, there has been little 
work on content biases. One of the few studies is that of Wisdom et al.62, in which 
participants had to find the highest-scoring combination of ‘items’ in a virtual 
environment in which they could view other participants’ items and scores. They 
found that content bias was an important element in participants’ social learning 
strategies, with participants copying the highest-scoring items in addition to using 
model- and frequency-dependent biases.  
 
There have been more studies examining model biases. A number of early studies 
from social psychology found strong effects of perceived expertise or status on 
people's judgements in domains such as aesthetic judgements63, visual perceptions64, 
gambling65, and attitudes66. There has also been work specifically focused on 
children's learning, since a great deal of what we know is learned as children, with a 
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good number of studies finding that children preferentially copy from older rather 
than younger models67-69. Cultural evolution researchers have extended and verified 
these early findings in light of recent theory and models. In an innovative experiment 
Wood et al.70 found that children were biased more towards older models than self-
professedly knowledgeable ones where these characteristics conflicted. Using adult 
participants, Mesoudi71 conducted a study in which participants constructed virtual 
(computer-based) projectile points to conduct virtual hunts (with variable rewards) 
and were able during multiple rounds to view and possibly copy other individuals' 
points. This experiment found evidence for the presence of success bias but noted that 
the presence of the bias was heterogenous: rather than all individuals using it, some 
individuals used it very often and others barely at all. Using a similar paradigm, 
Atkisson et al.72 found that individuals were more biased towards model 
characteristics, specifically the prestige of a model as indexed by the amount of time 
that other participants were said to have looked at the model’s arrowhead designs, 
rather than trait characteristics, i.e. the effectiveness of the arrowhead. 
 
Finally, a number of studies have examined frequency-dependent biases, primarily 
conformity. The famous early studies of Sherif73 and Asch74, which convincingly 
demonstrated that people may sometimes adopt the opinions of the majority, do not 
qualify as conformity under the cultural-evolutionary definition because it is not 
possible to tell whether people adopt the majority view with greater than 
proportionate probability19. Jacobs & Campbell35 used Sherif's auto-kinetic task with 
the replacement method, described above, starting with confederates and ending with 
naive participants; they found that the 'conformity' to exaggerated majority 
judgements was rapidly overwhelmed by people's trust in their individual perceptions. 
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More recently, a series of experiments by McElreath and colleagues75-77 utilised a 
virtual 'farming' task in which participants choose to 'harvest' one of two crops. Each 
crop has a stochastic payoff, and the optimal crop changes from time to time. Using 
variations on this design and model-fitting techniques, McElreath et al.75,77 concluded 
that individuals use a complex mix of payoff-biased and conformist learning, while 
Efferson et al. found individual differences, with some individuals using the 
conformity bias and others ignoring frequency information. Finally, an experiment by 
Efferson et al.78 using a variation on this design with Bolivian pastoralists found little 
evidence for either conformism or payoff-bias; this experiment is remarkable for its 
unusual (compared to other studies) participant group, an important step towards 
drawing conclusions valid for the entire human species. 
 
5. What are the population-level consequences of different social learning biases? 
This question has been addressed through mathematical modelling since the books of 
Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman18 and Boyd & Richerson19 and thus represents probably the 
most studied aspect of cultural evolution. The mathematical tools used to address this 
question are those relating to dynamical systems, both deterministic and stochastic, 
with the majority of models falling into the class of Markov chains (i.e. processes that 
evolve probabilistically in a way that depends only on their current state), usually 
analysed in discrete time-steps for ease of analysis. 
 
Like in evolutionary biology79, cultural evolutionary researchers have realised the 
usefulness of constructing explicit neutral models in which individuals learn traits 
entirely 'at random', without the use of any particular social learning biases. Also like 
in evolutionary biology, there are a number of ways of conceptualising 'at random'. A 
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series of 'random copying' models developed by Bentley et al.80,81 assumes that 
individuals copy the trait of a random member of their population, finding that the 
resulting distribution of trait frequencies will follow a power law (that is, a 
distribution in which the most popular trait types account for the majority of all trait 
copies, with successively less popular trait types accounting for smaller and smaller 
proportions of all trait copies), and noting similar distributions in traits such as the 
frequencies of baby names and dog breeds. This model has in fact even led to an 
advance in pure mathematics, where Eriksson et al.82 proved 'Bentley's conjecture' 
that the rate of turnover in this model is almost independent of the size of the 
population. Strimling et al.83 have developed a variant of the model in which 
individuals may fail to learn a trait with some probability. Alternatively, Cavalli-
Sforza & Feldman18 modelled the 'random drift' of continuous, rather than discrete, 
traits, characterising the rate at which populations would vary if each individual made 
a slight (additive) error during the learning process. 
 
The effects of specific biases can be seen against the background of the expectations 
generated by neutral models. Initial models of content, model, and frequency-
dependent biases were analysed by Boyd & Richerson19, partly with a view toward 
understanding their biological consequences. In particular, they found that conformist 
frequency-dependent bias leads to within-group homogeneity but between-group 
heterogeneity, a common phenomenon in humans61. They also identified the 
possibility of ‘runaway’ co-evolution between model preferences and trait values 
following model based (e.g. prestige) bias, which may explain exaggerated 
phenomena such as whole-body tattoos in certain societies. More recently, Strimling 
et al.84 investigated the dynamics of content bias when the 'fitness' of a trait is 
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partitioned into two components, 'diffusion' and 'retention', finding that the number of 
opportunities for learning was crucial in determining the evolutionary outcome, with 
traits with high ‘retention’ dominating only when individuals had a large number of 
opportunities for learning. Baldini85 investigated model biases, such as success- or 
prestige-bias, comparing the dynamics of biases in which individuals averaged the 
success of all individuals with a certain trait with biases in which individuals imitated 
the single most successful individual. He found that although there were many 
situations in which each bias performed better than random copying, there were some 
situations in which each was worse than random copying: for the averaging bias, this 
occurred when the optimal trait had high frequency in the population, and for the 
most-successful bias when an on average suboptimal trait had a high variance in its 
outcomes. Mesoudi & Lycett86 investigated the effect of conformist and anti-
conformist frequency-dependent biases on the distribution of trait frequencies, 
showing that conformity leads to distributions in which a small number of traits 
dominate others in frequency, and anti-conformity to distributions in which traits of 
intermediate frequency are favoured, both of which noticeably deviate from the 
power-law distribution noted above to result from random (unbiased) copying. 
 
These models lead to quantitative predictions and, conversely, allow inference from 
statistical data regarding a variety of traits. Researchers have also constructed and 
analysed models specific to certain classes of traits. Starting from Boyd & 
Richerson19,87, there has been a vibrant literature showing how human cooperative 
tendencies may have arisen through a process of 'cultural group selection', i.e. 
selection on groups differentiated by cultural traits (such as would be created by 
conformist bias, as noted above), and more recently researchers have applied the tools 
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of evolutionary game theory to modelling cultural traits in situations where the utility 
of a certain trait depends on the traits adopted by other individuals, of which 
cooperation is a primary example88,89. Another set of processes of biological 
importance that have inspired cultural evolutionary models are the Neolithic and 
Industrial demographic transitions, where researchers have modelled the effects of 
technological and social change (e.g. the spread of contraception) on population sizes 
and compositions, both as individual traits90 and in combination with other mediating 
traits91,92. Thus cultural evolutionary models provide both general explanatory 
schemes for cultural change and specific explanations for important biological and 
social phenomena. 
 
6. Discussion 
Cultural evolution is now a burgeoning field, and much has been achieved. Much also 
remains to be done, and the preceding review suggests several directions for future 
research. In general, there can never be too much replication, integration between 
theoretical and experimental studies, ecological validity in experiments, and realism 
in theories. The creation of detailed models of cognition, such as the Bayesian models 
noted above, which can be validated experimentally represents a fruitful line of 
research which currently has only been applied to relatively low-level cognitive 
processes. More challenging will be to model the cognitive processes underlying 
creativity and innovation, or the acquisition of motor skills such as stone tool 
manufacture. With respect to cumulative culture, it is still unclear exactly what 
cognitive and social factors allow humans but not other species to accumulate 
beneficial cultural traits over time, and there is some contradictory evidence regarding 
the relationship between population size and cultural accumulation. Further 
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experiments with more varied tasks and designs may resolve this apparent 
contradiction. The investigation of human social learning biases has shown that 
individuals show a good deal of heterogeneity in the biases they deploy, and that real 
life social learning biases tend to be complicated and composed of mixtures of simple 
biases; future experiments may investigate these complexities. As well as individual 
differences, there may be meaningful cross-cultural variation in social learning biases. 
Social psychological studies suggest that people from Western countries are less 
likely to employ biases such as conformity than people from East Asian countries93, 
although as noted above the sense of conformity tested in such studies does not match 
that used in the cultural evolution literature. Future cultural evolution studies might 
more fully explore cross-cultural variation in social learning biases, and the factors 
that generate this variation.  
 
In summary, theoretical models have led to a detailed understanding of cultural 
evolutionary dynamics, and future research should attempt to base modelling 
assumptions on empirically validated observations and describe the interplay between 
multiple, interlocking biases and processes. 
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